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INTRODUCTION

Sexual harassment was once so simple. In the 1970s, Diane Williams, a Department of Justice employee, faced repeated sexual advances from her supervisor-advances that she refused.' Her refusal
ultimately led to her termination, and her termination led her to sue.
This type of situation is what most people think of when envisioning
sexual harassment. But sexual harassment suits have moved well beyond Diane Williams.
For example, in a more recent case, a man sues because his gay
coworker makes sexual advances toward him at work.2 Other men sue
t B.A., Wheaton College, 1992; J.D., Cornell Law School, 2003. The author would
like to thank Troy CrossJosh Mayes, and Kan Nawaday for helpful comments on an earlier
draft of this Note.
I See Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 655-56 (D.D.C. 1976), vacated sub nom.
Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
2 Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 139-41 (4th Cir. 1996).
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because their male coworkers tease, grab, and otherwise intimidate
them because they are gay. 3 Still other men sue because they were
teased and harassed for being effeminate. 4 Finally, some men,
neither gay nor effeminate, sue because their male employer, engaging in behavior termed "horseplay," grabbed their buttocks and testicles at work. 5 Courts have understandably found these same-sex
harassment cases more difficult to adjudicate.
Yet other cases, while intuitively regarded as clear instances of
sexual harassment, have met with surprising fates. A female employee
in a predominantly male workplace endured her male supervisor and
coworkers simulating sex acts on a mannequin and engaging in
graphic discussions about oral sex. 6 Though a jury returned a verdict
in her favor, an appellate court set the verdict aside, 7 holding that the
plaintiffs coworkers were so generally lewd that they were not specifically harassing the plaintiff because of her sex. 8 Another court dismissed the case of a husband and wife who were both sexually
propositioned by their employer and who faced retaliation for refusing his advances. 9 The reason? Because the employer conditioned
the employment of both a male and a female employee on providing
sexual favors, the wife could not plausibly claim that the harassment
occurred because of her sex, nor could the husband. 10 This peculiar
result has become known as the "'equal opportunity harasser"'
defense. I I
If an employer sexually harasses members of one sex only, he

faces liability under Title VII for sex discrimination,' 2 which prohibits
3
See, e.g., Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, 123 S. Ct. 1573 (2003); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 259-60
(3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1155 (2002); Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372,
1374-75 (8th Cir. 1996).
4 See, e.g.,
Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 870 (9th Cir. 2001); Simonton
v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000); Doe ex rel. Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563,
567 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated by 523 U.S. 1001 (1998).
5 Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Harbert-Yeargin, Inc., 266 F.3d 498,
501-03 (6th Cir. 2001). See generally Margaret Talbot, Men Behaving Badly, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
Oct. 13, 2002, at 52, 54 (noting that "[s]ince 1992 the percentage of sexual[ ]harassment
charges filed by men with the E.E.O.C. and state agencies has been increasing steadily, to
13.7 percent in 2001, from 9.1 percent in 1992[,]" [m]en's claims of harassment often
center on what is considered 'horseplay,' or what [one employment lawyer] describes as
'bullying, hazing, adolescent kinds of behavior.'").
6 See Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods., Inc., 308 F.3d 351, 354 (4th Cir. 2002), reh'g en banc
granted, vacated Dec. 16, 2002.
7 Id. at 366.
8 See id. at 358.
9 Holman v. Indiana, 24 F. Supp. 2d 909, 911, 916 (N.D. Ind. 1998), affd, 211 F.3d
399 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 880 (2000).
10

Id. at 915.

1 1 See id. at 912.
12 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an employer "to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
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discrimination (of which sexual harassment is one form) "because of"
sex. 1' If he selects victims from both sexes, however, he escapes liability by showing that the harassing conduct was not directed at anyone
because of his or her sex. 14 The culprit for this mess is the interpretation of the "because of" sex requirement in Title VII.
What makes sexual harassment "because of" sex? Thus far, courts

have interpreted this requirement as a "but-for" test: 15 but for the

16
plaintiffs sex, would the conduct complained of still have occurred?
If the answer to this. question is yes, the plaintiff's claim fails under
Title VII. The unfortunate result of the but-for test has been that

plaintiffs in work environments where the most sexual harassment occurs, are often left without a federal remedy. 17 In those work environments in which the lewd and harassing behavior goes on irrespective
of the presence of women, or in which the offensive behavior is directed at members of both sexes, no employee can bring suit under

Title VII. 8
The fact that an interpretive test precludes a remedy for those
suffering the greatest harm, compels a search for a replacement test.
Devising such a replacement is the central purpose of this Note. Part
I explains the development of Title VII as a remedy for sex discrimination and the manner in which sexual harassment came to be recognized as one form of that discrimination. Part II discusses the recent
Supreme Court decision in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,
which held that same-sex sexual harassment is actionable sex discrimination under Title VII. 19 Part III explains the post-Oncale attempts of
lower federal courts to wrestle with the "because of" sex requirement
as applied to both male and female plaintiffs. Part IV provides a brief
survey of the major academic conceptualizations of sexual harassment, some of which attempt to create purely normative theories of
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
1'- See id.; Holman, 211 F.3d at 402. But see Equal Employment Opportunity Comm. v.
Harbert-Yeargin, Inc., 266 F.3d 498, 522 (6th Cir. 2001) (Guy, Jr., J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (holding that "gross, vulgar, male horseplay" between male employer and male employees did not constitute discrimination because of sex); infra Part
III.A.
14
See Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods., Inc., 308 F.3d 351, 356 (4th Cir. 2002), reh'g en banc
granted, vacated Dec. 16, 2002; Holman, 211 F.3d at 403 (noting that Title VII does not cover
the "bisexual harasser").
15 This interpretation originates with Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57
(1986).
16
See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs. Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998); Harris v.
Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (GinsburgJ., concurring).
17
See Ocheltree, 308 F.3d at 356-59; McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors,
72 F.3d 1191, 1193-94, 1195-96 (4th Cir. 1996), abrogated 6y Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79.
18 See cases cited supra note 16.
19 523 U.S. at 82.
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the wrongness of sexual harassment as guides for the courts, and
others of which attempt to link the wrong of sexual harassment to that
of sex discrimination. Part V articulates a new test for the "because
of" sex requirement in Title VII. This new test is then applied to both
actual and hypothetical cases as a way of comparing it to the but-for
test. This Note concludes that the new test remedies the defects of
the but-for test and should be adopted as a replacement.
I
TITLE VII AND THE EMERGENCE OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
AS SEX DISCRIMINATION

Sexual harassment plaintiffs often file their claims in federal
court under Title VII, an antidiscrimination law enacted as part of the
1964 Civil Rights Act. 20 Title VII does not specifically prohibit sexual
harassment. Rather, it makes it unlawful "for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 2 1 The prohibition on sex discrimination was added to Title VII "at the last minute
on the floor of the House of Representatives," 22 leaving courts with
"little legislative history to guide [them] in interpreting the Act's prohibition against discrimination based on 'sex."23
Courts did not immediately recognize sexual harassment as actionable sex discrimination under Title VII. 24 In Come v. Bausch &

Lomb, Inc., a male supervisor made sexual advances toward two female
subordinate employees. The district court that heard the claim regarded the advances as the expression of "nothing more than a personal proclivity" and an attempt to satisfy "a personal urge." 25 Because

"no employer policy [was] involved," the court feared that allowing
20
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII, § 703, 78 Stat. 255 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (2000)).
21
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (2000). Title VII was amended by the Civil Rights Act of
1991, which provided compensatory and punitive damages to victims of discrimination.
The Supreme Court has explained that Title VII "not only covers 'terms' and 'conditions'
in the narrow contractual sense, but 'evinces a congressional intent to strike at the entire
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in employment."' Oncale, 523 U.S. at
78 (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986)).
22 Meitor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 63; 110 CONG. REC. 2577-84 (1964) (statements of
Representative Howard Smith, proposing inclusion of sex discrimination provision in
hopes of defeating entire legislation); HuGH DAVIS GRAHAM, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE PRESIDENCY: RACE AND GENDER IN AMERICAN POLITICS 1960-1972, at 75 (1992).

23
24

Meritor Say. Bank, 477 U.S. at 64.
See, e.g., Miller v. Bank of Am., 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd, 600 F.2d
211 (9th Cir. 1979); Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975),
vacated by 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977); Barnes v. Train, 1974 WL 10628 (D.D.C. 1974), rev'd
sub nom. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
25 Come, 390 F. Supp. at 163, vacated by 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
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such causes of action would result in "a potential federal lawsuit every
time any employee made amorous or sexually oriented advances toward another."2 Similarly, in Tomkins v. Public Service Electric & Gas
Co., the district court dismissed a claim for sex discrimination where a
supervisor invited an office worker, Adrienne Tomkins, to lunch, purportedly to discuss a promotion. Once at lunch, he made sexual advances toward her and threatened both personal and professional
recrimination if she refused. 27 The court dismissed largely based on
its fear of inviting a flood of frivolous litigation: "If the plaintiffs view
were to prevail, no superior could, prudently, attempt to open a social
dialogue with any subordinate of either sex. An invitation to dinner
could become an invitation to a federal lawsuit if a once harmonious
28
relationship turned sour at some later time."
However, while Adrienne Tomkins' case was pending on appeal, 29 the D.C. District Court allowed a cause of action under Title
VII by Diana Williams, a former Department ofJustice employee, who
was fired for refusing the sexual advances of her supervisor.""° For the
first time, a federal court recognized that the "requirement of willingness to provide sexual consideration" creates "an artificial barrier to
employment" that was applied to members of one sex but not to the
other, thereby constituting sex discrimination under federal law."'
Subsequently, citing the Williams case, the Third Circuit reversed the
32
dismissal of Tomkins' claim.
The following year, the D.C. Circuit set forth in Barnes v. Costle
what became the standard test for actionable sexual harassment under
Title VII.33 The plaintiff, Paulette Barnes, was fired for refusing to
have sex with her supervisor.3 4 The court found that the plaintiffs
termination occurred "because of" sex within the meaning of Title
VII, explaining that her "job was conditioned upon submission to sexual relations-an exaction which the supervisor would not have
sought from any male."3 5 Stated as a traditional but-for question, the
inquiry that emerged was, "but for the plaintiffs sex, would the harass26

Id.

27 Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 555, 557 (D.NJ. 1976),
rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
28

Id. at 557.

29
10

Tomkins, 568 F.2d at 1048.
Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), vacated sub nom. Williams v. Bell,

587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978). On remand, the district court again found a violation of
Title VII. See Williams v. Civiletti, 487 F. Supp. 1387, 1389 (D.D.C. 1980).
31
Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. at 659.
'32 See Tomkins, 568 F.2d at 1048-49.
33
34
35

561 F.2d 983, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
Id. at 985.
Id. at 989 (footnote omitted).
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ing conduct have occurred?" -36 If the question was answered in the
7
negative, the conduct was actionable under Title VII.3
The above cases are all instances of "quid pro quo" sexual harassment, in which the terms of employment are conditioned upon the
receipt of sexual favors from the employee.3 8 Thus, the standard case
of quid pro quo harassment would be an employer or supervisor telling an employee, "sleep with me or you're fired." As is clear from the
foregoing discussion, the typical motive of sexual desire in quid pro
cases initially caused courts to place them beyond the purview of Title
VII, regarding them instead as private matters. When quid pro quo
situations finally did emerge as cases that could be litigated, they did
so only because the sexual expectations were imposed exclusively on
women.
In the 1980s, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), the agency responsible for enforcing Title VII, identified a
second type of conduct that can form the basis of a sexual harassment
claim. 39 Conduct that has "the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment" gives rise to a
hostile environment type sexual harassment claim. 4 11 The Supreme
Court recognized this type of harassment as sex discrimination in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson. 4 1 Mechelle Vinson brought suit claiming
that the vice president of the bank at which she was employed, sexually harassed her for several years. 42 The vice president, Sidney Taylor, pressured Vinson into having sex with him, "exposed himself to
her," "fondled her in front of other employees," and "forcibly raped
36

The E.E.O.C.'s position on sexual harassment adopts the but-for inquiry as well:

[I]n sexual harassment cases as in all other sex discrimination cases, the
relevant question is whether the plaintiff was treated differently because of
his or her sex.... When a plaintiff can demonstrate that he or she would
not have been sexually harassed but for his or her sex, that plaintiff states a
claim for sex discrimination under Title VII.
Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong With Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691, 704
(1997) (quoting Brief for E.E.O.C. as Amicus Curiae in Opposition to Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment at 5-6, Waag v. Thomas Pontiac, Buick, GMC, Inc., 930 F. Supp.
393 (D. Minn. 1996) (No. 3-95-538) (alteration in original)).
37
See Barnes, 561 F.2d at 989 n.49. What is more puzzling about the Barnes opinion is
that the court regarded as "immaterial" the fact that Barnes's employment was conditioned
on sexual activity rather than on something else; all that mattered was that the condition
on employment applied only to women. Id.
38
See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
39 See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2002).
40
Id.
41
477 U.S. 57 (1986). Meitor Savings Bank is also the first Supreme Court opinion to
recognize any form of sexual harassment as sex discrimination under Title VII. See Ann
Juliano & StewartJ. Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual Harassment Cases, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 548,
555 (2001).
42
477 U.S. at 60.
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her on several occasions." 43 The bank claimed, among other things,
that Title VII only protected against "economic" or "tangible" discrimination. 44 The Court rejected this view, and clarified that "[t]he
phrase 'terms, conditions, or privileges of employment' evinces a congressional intent 'to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women' in employment." 45 Such disparate
treatment extended to creating a hostile work environment for women by sexually harassing them. As the Court explained:
"Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to
sexual equality at the workplace that racial harassment is to racial
equality. Surely, a requirement that a man or woman run a gauntlet
of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed to work
and make a living can be as demeaning and disconcerting as the
46
harshest of racial epithets."
However, in recognizing the creation of a hostile environment by
sexual harassment, the Court added that the conduct must be "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's]
47
employment.' ,,
The level of severity the conduct must reach, and
the effect it must have on the victim, was established in Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc. 48 The plaintiff, Theresa Harris, was one of only two
female managers working for the defendant forklift company, the
other being the daughter of Charles Hardy, the company president.49
Hardy made clear to Harris his disdain for female managers: he paid
her less than the men, denied her benefits given to the men, made
her bring coffee to meetings, and made a variety of sexual and sexist
5
comments to her. "
The Court granted relief to Theresa Harris, and, in doing so, laid
out important standards for future hostile environment cases. 5 1 First,
the Court reiterated that plaintiffs bringing hostile environment
claims must meet a "severity" requirement (absent in quid pro quo
cases) by showing that the conduct was "severe or pervasive enough to
create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment. '5 2 Second,
the severity requirement was given both an objective component and
43
44

i.

Id. at 64.

45
Id. (citing L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)
and quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971)).
46
Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982)).
47
d. (internal quotations and citations omitted) (alteration in original).
48
510 U.S. 17 (1993).
49
See id. at 19; Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683,

1710-12 (1998).
50
See 510 U.S. at 19.
51
See id. at 21-24.
52
Id. at 21.
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a subjective component: the conduct must be objectively severe as determined from the perspective of a reasonable person, and the plain53
tiff herself must perceive the environment to be hostile or abusive.
Third, in meeting the subjective requirement, the plaintiff need not
show psychological injury. 54 Rather, psychological harm is simply one

factor among many in determining whether harassment has occurred:
"So long as the environment would reasonably be perceived, and is
perceived, as hostile or abusive, there is no need for it also to be psychologically injurious. ''5 5 The hostility of the environment is instead
determined by looking at the totality of circumstances, including, but
not limited to, "the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an
employee's work performance. '5 6 Thus, the pattern may be short in
duration if it is sufficiently intense to affect the working environment,
57
or it may be persistent, but less intense.
Hostile environment claims comprise the vast majority of sexual
harassment suits. Between 1986 and 1995, nearly 70% of the suits
brought included only a hostile environment claim, and another
22.5% of suits included a hostile environment claim in addition to a
quid pro quo claim. 58 However, plaintiffs bringing hostile environment claims are more likely to prevail when the complained of con59
duct is of a sexual, as opposed to merely a sexist, nature.
A third category of sexual harassment suits based on gender stereotyping appeared following the Supreme Court's 1989 decision in
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 60 Ann Hopkins worked in an accounting
firm and was denied partnership because she failed to exhibit stereotypically feminine qualities. 61 One partner advised her to "'walk
more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear
makeup, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.' " 62 Another partner
suggested that she take "'a course at charm school.'"'6 The Court
See id. at 21-22.
See id. at 22.
Id. (citation omitted).
56
Id. at 23.
57
See Ross v. Double Diamond, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 261, 270 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (discussing frequency as a factor in sexual harassment claims).
58
Juliano & Schwab, supra note 41, at 565.
59
Id. at 555.
60 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion), superseded by statute as stated in Stender v.
Lucky Stores, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1302, 1305 (N.D. Cal. 1992). Because Title VII does not
explicitly forbid gender stereotyping, plaintiffs claiming this type of injury stand in a precarious position. Circuits have split over both the scope of Hopkins and whether it applies to
men as well as to women. See infra Parts Ill & V.
61 Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 234-35.
62
Id. (citing Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1117 (D.D.C. 1985).
63
Id. (citation omitted).
53
54
55
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found that the plaintiff was denied partnership not because she failed
to exhibit the qualities of a manager, but rather because she failed to
exhibit the qualities of a female manager. 64 At the same time, had
Hopkins not displayed certain aggressive qualities, she would not
likely have ascended to a position in which she would be in consideration for partnership in the first place. 65 In short, Hopkins was judged
by a different standard than other candidates for partnership because
she was a woman. Given that the qualities she possessed would have
been acceptable in a male manager and therefore would not have cost
her an opportunity to achieve partnership, the Court held that the
accounting firm engaged in sex stereotyping that was actionable sex
66
discrimination under Title VII.
It is important to note that none of the aforementioned cases
featured male sexual harassment claimants. Initially, courts contemplated that Title VII provided protection exclusively to women
harmed by sexual harassment. Not until 1998 did the Supreme Court
address whether, and to what extent, Title VII protects men.
II
THE ONCALE DECISION

In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., the Supreme Court
first addressed same sex sexual harassment under Title VII. 6 7 Joseph

Oncale worked on an oil platform in the Gulf of Mexico as part of an
eight person crew. 68 A fellow employee and two supervisors subjected
Oncale to humiliating actions with sexual overtones, sexually assaulted him, and threatened him with rape.69 Fearing additional and
more severe abuse, Oncale quit his job and filed suit. 7" Both the dis-

trict court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Oncale, as
7
a male, had no cause of action under Title VII. 1
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the prohibition of discrimination "because of ... sex" found in Title VII protects both men
64

See id. at 250.

Id. at 251 ("An employer who objects to aggressiveness in women but whose positions require this trait places women in an intolerable and impermissible catch 22: out of a
job if they behave aggressively and out of ajob if they do not. Title VII lifts women out of
this bind.").
66
Id. at 258.
67
See 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
68
Id.
69
Id. The Supreme Court declined to mention the details of Oncale's harassment, id.
at 76-77, but the Fifth Circuit indicated that the victim had a bar of soap pushed into his
anus and was restrained by one coworker while another put his penis on Oncale's neck.
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 118-19 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 523
U.S. at 82.
70
Oncale, 82 F.3d at 119.
71
ld. at 118.
65
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and women. 72 It further stated that same sex sexual harassment is
actionable regardless of whether one of the parties to the harassment
is homosexual. 73 In other words, the conduct need not be motivated
by sexual desire in order to constitute harassment; it simply must be
directed at the victim "because of" his or her sex.7 4 While acknowledging that Title VII did not initially intend to target same sex harassment against men, the Court explained that "statutory prohibitions
often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable
evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the
75
principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed."
In determining whether conduct is directed at a victim "because
of" his or her sex, the Court instructed an inquiry into whether the
victim suffers certain treatment that members of the other sex do not
experience. 76 Once a court finds disparate and offensive treatment, it
determines whether such treatment rises to the level of harassment
"from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiffs position, considering 'all the circumstances.' ' 77 Thus, as the Court explained, the actions of a football coach might be abusive when
directed toward his secretary in the office, but not when aimed at his
"

78
players on the football field.

The Oncaleopinion suggests three ways for plaintiffs to establish a
same sex harassment claim under Title VII. First, a plaintiff could establish explicit or implicit proposals of sexual activity "if there were
credible evidence that the harasser was homosexual. '79 Second, a female victim might show that she was harassed by another woman in a
way that makes clear that "the harasser is motivated by general hostility to the presence of women in the workplace."8"" Third, a same sex
harassment plaintiff might "offer direct comparative evidence about
how the alleged harasser treated members of both sexes in a mixed
sex workplace." 8'

Because the Supreme Court decided only that same sex harassment was actionable under Title VII, the Court remanded Oncale for
further proceedings.8 2 The plaintiff in that case was unlikely to prevail based on the any of the three evidentiary routes the Court listed.
72

Oncale, 523 U.S. at 78, 82.

See id. at 79-80.
Id. at 80.
75
Id. at 79.
76
Id. at 80 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring)).
77
Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 23).
73

74

78

Id.

79
80
81
82

Id.at 80.
Id.

Id. at 80-81.
Id. at 82.
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After all, the opinion does not suggest that either sexual desire8 3 or a
general hostility to men in the workplace motivated Oncale's harassers. Also, the plaintiff probably could not produce comparative evidence on how members of both sexes were treated because the
workplace was predominantly, if not entirely, male.8 4 Even assuming
that the workplace in Oncale was mixed sex, the plaintiff would need
to prove further that he was singled out and treated differently because of his sex, not because of his insufficiently masculine behavior
85
(the reason given by the harassers for their behavior).
The Court's opinion leaves unclear whether the stated list of ways
a same sex plaintiff may prevail under Title VII is exhaustive. 86 Even if
other ways of prevailing are possible, it is likely that plaintiffs will face
greater difficulty in showing why the conduct at issue, while perhaps
harassing, is actually discriminatory. Thus, even after Oncale, same sex
harassment plaintiffs, particularly men, have a precarious claim under
Title VII.
Finally, an odd but likely result of Oncale is that it appears to expose homosexuals to liability for harassing members of the same sex,
but fails to protect homosexuals from harassment at the hands of
other men, unless the harassers themselves are homosexual. Thus,
post-Oncale, men could face liability as harassers under Title VII because of their sexual orientation, but enjoy no protection as harassment victims because of their sexual orientation under Title VII.
III
THE POST-ONCALE LANDSCAPE

A.

Male Plaintiffs After Oncale

The Oncale decision has lead to confusion among the circuit
courts. This confusion stems from the difficulty in reconciling Oncale's extension of Title VII to protect men with Oncale's possibly exclusive list of ways same sex harassment plaintiffs can show harassment
"because of sex."' 7 One can read Oncale broadly by combining it with
83

Proceeding by way of this evidentiary route leads to bizarre cases, wherein courts

examine individual instances and comments to determine whether they constitute "earnest
sexual solicitation." See, e.g., Lack v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 240 F.3d 255, 260-61 (4th Cir.
2001); Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1009-10 (7th Cir. 1999); English v.
Pohanka of Chantilly, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 833, 845-47 (E.D. Va. 2002).
84
Oncale, 523 U.S. at 77 (describing Oncale's coworkers as an "eight[ ]man crew").
85
See id. at 79.
86 At least two cases have suggested that the three enumerated evidentiary routes in
Oncale are not exhaustive. See ShepTherd, 168 F.3d at 1009; English, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 843.
87
Several lower federal courts have decided that the list in Oncale is not exhaustive.
See Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied,
2003 WL 144593; Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 264 (3d Cir. 2001),
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1155 (2002); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th
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Price Waterhouse to support a cause of action for men who are harassed
for being effeminate. Or, one can read Oncale narrowly to support a
cause of action for men only in the hypothetical situations listed by
the Court.
The Ninth Circuit has read Oncale broadly, as is clear by its deci88
sion in Nichols v. Azteca RestaurantEnterprises.
Antonio Sanchez sued
his employer for gender stereotyping after his male coworkers and a
male supervisor verbally harassed him for being effeminate. 89 On a
daily basis, Sanchez's restaurant coworkers teased him for carrying his
tray "'like a woman,"' and called him "'faggot"' and "'fucking female
whore. "90 Sanchez claimed that "the holding in Price Waterhouse applies with equal force to a man who is discriminated against for acting
too feminine[;]" the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed. 91 The
court therefore concluded that Sanchez had met his burden of showing that the harassment was "because of" sex. 92
In a more recent Ninth Circuit case, simply showing that "physical conduct of a sexual nature" occurred as part of the harassment was
enough to state an actionable claim for same sex harassment. 93 Medina Rene, an openly gay man, alleged that his male coworkers and
his supervisor "grabbed him in the crotch and poked their fingers in
his anus through his clothing." 94 The Ninth Circuit explained that
"grabbing, poking, rubbing or mouthing areas of the body linked
to
sexuality... is inescapably 'because of... sex.'
The court's reasoning depends on the simple premise that all forms of sexual assault are
discriminatory acts based on sex. The court treated as irrelevant
whether the plaintiff was targeted because of his sexual orientation
and instead focused simply on the notion that acts directed at body
parts "clearly linked to . . . sexuality[,]" satisfy the "because of sex"
96
requirement in Title VII.
",95

Although the Ninth Circuit claimed to draw support from Oncale,
the Oncale opinion never stated that acts directed at sexual body parts
are per se discrimination "because of" sex. Nevertheless, the Ninth CirCir. 2001); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 37-38 (2d Cir. 2000); Jones v. Pac. Rail
Servs., 2001 WL 1223533, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 2001).
88 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001).
89
Id. at 869.
90
Id. at 870.
91

Id. at 874.

92

Id. at 875.

9?
Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986)), cert. (denied, 123 S. Ct. 1573 (2003).
94 Id. at 1064.
95
Id. at 1066 (citing Doe ex rel. Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 580 (7th Cir.
1997)).
96
Id.
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cuit found "two lessons" in Oncale to support its holding.9 7 First, it
read Oncale as interpreting Title VII to prohibit "severe or pervasive
same[ ]sex offensive sexual touching."9 Second, the Ninth Circuit
determined that "offensive sexual touching is actionable discrimination even in a same[ ]sex workforce."9 9 In short, the Ninth Circuit's
flexible reading of Oncale led it to conclude that
discrimination can take place between members of the same sex,
not merely between members of the opposite sex. Thus, Oncale did
not need to show that he was treated worse than members of the
opposite sex. It was enough to show that he suffered discrimination
in comparison to other men. MO

Because Rene was mistreated as compared with other men, the Ninth Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment in favor of the
defendant. 101

In dissent, Judge Hug accused the majority of ignoring the plain
language of the Oncale opinion. 112 He stressed that the Supreme
Court has never held "that workplace harassment, even harassment
between men and women, is automatically discrimination because of
sex merely because the words used have sexual content or connotations."'()" As Justice Ginsburg stated in her concurring opinion in
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.: "The critical issue, Title VII's text indi-

cates, is whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous
terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex
' 11 4

are not exposed."

Writing for three judges in concurrence, Judge Pregerson located
Rene, as the court did previously in Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises,105 at the crossroads of Price Waterhouse and Oncale.'0 6 Because in

Price Waterhouse at least one sort of gender stereotyping 1 7 was found
actionable, and because in Oncale at least some kinds of same sex harassment against men were found actionable, Judge Pregerson reasoned that, together, the two cases supported a cause of action for

100

d. at 1067.
Id
I.
I.

101

See id. at 1068.

97
98
99

See id. at 1072-76 (HugJ, dissenting).
1o() Id. at 1073 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80
102

(1998)).
104

Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (em-

phasis added).
105
106

107

See 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001).
Rene, 305 F.3d at 1068 (Pregerson, J., concurring).
The terms "gender stereotyping" and "gender discrimination" will henceforth be

used interchangeably.
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men subjected to gender stereotyping. 0 8 Although the plaintiff did

not explicitly claim to be a victim of gender stereotyping, the court
held him to have stated such an action. 10 9 Therefore, Judge Pregerson argued that, like the Nichols plaintiff, Rene should have a remedy
for gender discrimination due to the combination of the Oncale and
0

Price Waterhouse decisions. "
A superficially less surprising post-Oncale outcome occurred in
Bibby v. Philadelphia Coca Cola Bottling Co., in which the Third Circuit
reaffirmed the district court's judgment that Title VII does not prohibit same sex harassment based on sexual orientation.' 1 ' As noted
earlier, this result is warranted and predictable given the language of
Title VII, which does not list sexual orientation as a protected characteristic. 112 Title VII only prohibits discrimination based on race,
color, religion, sex and national origin.'"1 3 However, the result stands
in stark contrast to the Ninth Circuit's willingness to allow Title VII
harassment claims based on gender stereotyping. One would predict,
then, that the Third Circuit would dismiss same sex harassment claims
if based either on sexual orientation or on gender stereotyping. But,
this prediction turns out to be wrong. Indeed, in Bibby, the Third Circuit indicated a willingness to allow the plaintiff's claim to go forward
had he also claimed that he "was harassed because he failed to comply
114
with societal stereotypes of how men ought to appear or behave."
Therefore, had the plaintiff, who was in fact gay, argued that he
was harassed because of his failure to comply with masculine stereotypes, his cause of action likely would have survived, but because he
argued that he was harassed because he was gay, his cause of action
was dismissed." 5 Arguably, however, harassment because of sexual
orientation is, at least in most cases, harassment because of failure to
comply with masculine stereotypes."t 6 If being heterosexual is part of
the masculine stereotype, it makes little sense to distinguish among
varieties of animus in this way. However, were the court to allow a
108
109
11o
111

Rene, 305 F.3d at 1068 (Pregerson, J., concurring).
Id. at 1068-69.
Id.

112

260 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1155 (2002).
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (2000).

113

See id.

114

Bibby, 260 F.3d at 264.

115

See id.

See Recent Cases: Employment Law-Title VI-Sex Discrimination-NinthCircuit Holds
that Male Coworkers' and Supervisor's Harassment of Male Employee for Failingto Meet Sex Stereotype Constitutes Sex Discrimination-Nicholsv. Azteca Rest. Enters., 115 HARV. L. REV. 2074,
2080-81 (2002) (noting that "allegations of homosexuality often go hand in hand with
allegations of gender deviance.... [W] orkplace discrimination against gays and lesbians is
itself a form of sex stereotyping[," and that "[s]uch discrimination is premised on the
notion that gays and lesbians fail to act like 'real men and women' should act: 'real men'
only have sex with women and 'real women' only have sex with men" (footnote omitted)).
116
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cause of action explicitly based on sexual orientation to go forward, it
would contravene the plain language of Title VII. This quandary simply forces plaintiffs to resort to clever pleading in stating the reasons
for their harassment.' 17 A more consistent approach would be to allow both types of claims as variants of gender stereotyping cases, or to
18
disallow both as beyond the purview of Title VII. 1
The Sixth Circuit recently encountered an entirely new same sex
harassment suit, involving male employees, neither gay nor effeminate, '19 complaining about vulgar, gross "horseplay" in a mostly male
workplace.'2(1 The plaintiffs alleged that they "were subjected to unwanted touching, poking, and prodding in their genital areas, and to
21
a hostile work environment that allowed such behavior to flourish."'
After the jury returned a verdict for plaintiffs Woods and Carlton, the
defendant, Harbert-Yeargin, Inc., moved for judgment as a matter of
law, which the district court granted with respect to Woods's claim but
122
denied with respect to Carlton's claim.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment against
Woods and reversed the district court's judgment in favor of Carlton. 123" In short, both Woods and Carlton ultimately lost. Woods's
claim failed because Harbert-Yeargin neither knew nor should have
known of the harassment against Woods. 24 Dissenting with respect to
Carlton's claim, Judge Gilman argued that the trial testimony amply
supported a jury verdict for Carlton by establishing that males in the
mixed sex workplace were subjected to harassment of a sexual nature
that females were not.12 The supervisor himself testified that he
117 The plaintiff in Simonton v. Runyon claimed discrimination based on sexual orientation or, in the alternative, on sexual stereotypes. See 232 F.3d 33, 35-37 (2d Cir. 2000).
The Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's dismissal of both claims. See id. at 38.
Though the court agreed that the treatment that the plaintiff suffered was "morally reprehensible," it reiterated that such discrimination is not cognizable tinder Title VII. Id. at 35.
The court found the discrimination claim based on sexual stereotypes to be legally "more
substantial," but factually insufficient, adding that it "express[ed] no opinion as to how this
issue would be decided in a future case in which it is squarely presented and sufficiently
pled." Id. at 37. The First Circuit reached a similar result in Higgins v. New Balance Athletic
Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259-60 (lst Cir. 1999).
118 This choice will be discussed more fully infra Part V.B.3.
119 More properly, the employees did not complain of any gender stereotyping, teasing based on being effeminate, or failing to conform to gender stereotypes.
120
See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Harbert-Yeargin, Inc., 266 F.3d
498, 502 (6th Cir. 2001).
121
Id. at 501.
122 See id. at 500.
123 Id. at 523 n.7. The opinion of judge Gilman is the majority opinion with respect to
Woods's claim, but a dissenting opinion with respect to Carlton's claim. Judge Guy's opin-

ion is the opinion of the court with respect to Carlton's claim. Id. at 519 & n.L
124

Id. at 518.

125 lI. at 506. Notably, however, only three out of two hundred and ninety-two employees were women, and they worked in the office and not in the field where most of the male
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had never touched a female employee in the breast, buttocks, or
pubic area, nor would he have done so, even though he admitted to
touching male employees in the nipples, buttocks, and pubic areas.
[Another supervisor] stated that he would never thump the genitals
of a woman, although he acknowledged having done so to a male

employee. 126

Judge Gilman's reasoning seems to accord with Oncale. Males in the
workplace were subjected to disparate treatment and in this case, the
disparate treatment was of a severe and sexual nature.
In an unintended illustration of the difficult plight of male plaintiffs under Title VII, Judge Guy, in an opinion joined by Judge Morris,
expressed sarcasm for the very nature of the case before him:
Georgie Porgie pudding and pie
Goosed the men and made them cry
Upon the women he laid no hand
127
So it cost his employer 300 grand.
Judge Guy's opinion suggested at various points that the male employees simply should be able to tolerate such conduct.128 At one point,
he asked rhetorically, if the court did not rule against the plaintiffs,
"what's next-towel snapping in the locker room?"12 9 This comment
was surprising given the severity of the conduct. Plaintiff Carlton, a
1 30
welder, was subjected to sexual grabbing while he was welding.
Clearly, such conduct is distracting, and possibly dangerous. But, acemployees worked. Id. at 503; id. at 520 (Guy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). These facts cut somewhat against Judge Gilman's conclusion.
126
Id. at 505.
127
Id. at 520 (Guy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
128
Possibly working against his claim was Carlton's physical stature. He was described
as "'maybe 6-foot-5 and 250 pounds'" and nicknamed "'the Marlboro Man"' by the secretaries in the office. See Talbot, supra note 5, at 52, 54. Judge Guy's opinion suggests that
the "Marlboro Man" should be able to handle such "horseplay."
129
Harbert-Yeargin,Inc., 266 F.3d at 522 (Guy, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Recall that the same dire predictions were made in dismissing the earliest opposite
sex harassment cases. See supra Part I. The Seventh Circuit has also drawn a comparison
between initial resistance to opposite sex harassment cases and current resistance to same
sex harassment cases:
Here we are, twenty years later, and the sky has not fallen. We are not, it
turns out, incapable of distinguishing between the occasional off-colorjoke,
stray remark, or rebuffed proposition, and a work environment that is rendered hostile by severe or pervasive harassment .... When a man complains that he has been sexually harassed by another man, then, we know
how to distinguish between harassment and "horseplay"; we have been making that very distinction for years in the cases that female plaintiffs have
brought.
Doe ex rel. Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 591 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated by 523 U.S.
1001 (1998).
130
266 F.3d at 501 ("Carton had bent over a table while welding, when he felt a hand
that 'kind of comes in from the backside to my testicles and kind of comes all the way
around to the bottom of my back. I just threw the hood down. I almost lost it. I really
did."').
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cording to Judge Guy, "f[t]he error is in concluding that all harassment of a sexual nature amounts, ipso facto, to gender
discrimination."' 1 Instead, the two judge majority found the crucial
question to be whether the plaintiffs could show that the supervisor's
actions were motivated by a general hostility to men in the workplace. 132 Judge Guy surmised that, far from having hostility toward
men in the workplace, "[the harasser] liked nothing better than to
have men in the workplace. If not, who else would he roughhouse
with?"1 "'
Most striking about Judge Guy's opinion is his understanding of
"hostility" to a group in the workplace. If a harasser's desire to keep
men in the workplace for the purpose of roughhousing negates a
claim of hostility to men in the workplace, would not a desire to keep
women in the workplace for sexual titillation negate a claim of hostility to women in the workplace? Indeed, Judge Guy's reasoning would
jettison nearly all opposite sex harassment cases as well. A male harasser
could always be said to "like nothing better" than to have women in
the workplace, for otherwise there would be no one to harass or sexually proposition. The error here is in thinking that "hostility" is assessed from the perspective of the defendant rather than from the
perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiffs position.13 4 If the
conduct is unwelcome or if it offends and injures the plaintiff, the
135
defendant's actual internal attitude toward the victim is irrelevant.
What emerges from this post-Oncalelandscape for male victims of
same sex harassment? Most likely, those harassed by homosexuals fare
best given that they alone fit clearly within the language of Oncale.
Male victims of gender stereotyping also fare reasonably well in some
circuits. Those who are gay might be able to prevail on a claim of
gender stereotyping if they are also teased for being effeminate, or if
they can convince the court that heterosexuality is part of a gender
stereotype. Those who conform to gender stereotypes, however, thus
far appear to have no remedy, no matter how severely they are
harassed.

I-"1

Id. at 521 (Guy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 521-22 (Guy, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part).
1I.at 522 (Guy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
134 Cf Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993) ("[l]f the victim does not
subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive, the conduct has not actually altered
the conditions of the victim's employment, and there is no Title VII violation."); Meritor
Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986) ("The correct inquiry is whether [the plaintiff]
by her conduct indicated that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome, not whether
her actual participation in sexual intercourse was voluntary.").
135 See Harris,510 U.S. at 21-22; Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 68.
132
13'
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Female Plaintiffs After Oncale

Though one would expect the plight of female plaintiffs to be less
affected by the Oncale decision, female victims of opposite sex harassment may face greater difficulties due to Oncale's stringent interpretation of the "because of" sex requirement. The following two cases
illustrate these difficulties.
Karen Holman alleged that her supervisor at the Indiana Department of Transportation ("IDOT") touched her inappropriately, made
sexist remarks to her, solicited sex from her, and retaliated against her
when she rejected his advances. 136 This would appear to be a straightforward case of sexual harassment and sex discrimination under Title
VII. However, the district court granted IDOT's motion to dismiss
Holman's claim, 13 7 and the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal. 38
Unfortunately for Holman, her husband-and co-worker-was also a
victim of the supervisor's sexual advances.1 39 Therefore, as a matter of
law, neither Karen Holman nor her husband could show the harass140
ment occurred "because of" sex.
Quoting the disparate treatment language of Oncale, the Seventh
Circuit emphasized that Title VII requires a showing that the harasser
subjected the plaintiff to terms of employment to which members of
the opposite sex were not exposed. 41 Discrimination after Oncale
therefore requires a gender-comparative analysis that leaves the
"equal opportunity harasser" with an affirmative defense to liability.1 42
This result is troubling for the obvious reason that the most active
136

137
138
139
140

Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 401 (7th Cir. 2000).
Holman v. Indiana, 24 F. Supp. 2d 909, 910 (N.D. Ind. 1998).
211 F.3d at 401.
Id. at 400-01.
Id. at 401.

141
Id. at 403. The Seventh Circuit did not subscribe to "equal opportunity harassing"
prior to Oncale. See Doe ex rel. Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 578-80 (7th Cir.
1997), vacated by 523 U.S. 1001 (1998). Similarly, the Ninth Circuit, at least until Oncale,
rejected the equal opportunity harasser defense. See Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25
F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[E]ven if [the harasser] used sexual epithets equal in
intensity and in an equally degrading manner against male employees, he cannot thereby
'cure' his conduct toward women.... [W]e do not rule out the possibility that both men
and women working at Showboat have viable claims .. . for sexual harassment.").
142 See Holman, 211 F.3d at 403. The court explains the rationale behind the "equal
opportunity harasser" bar to liability:
[B]ecause Title VII is premised on eliminating discrimination,inappropriate
conduct that is inflicted on both sexes, or is inflicted regardless of sex, is
outside the statute's ambit. Title VII does not cover the "equal opportunity" or "bisexual" harasser, then, because such a person is not discriminating on the basis of sex. He is not treating one sex better (or worse) than
the other; he is treating both sexes the same (albeit badly).
Id. Other Seventh Circuit cases have also emphasized the importance of unequal treatment of the sexes in evaluating sexual harassment claims. See, e.g., Shepherd v. Slater
Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1008-09 (7th Cir. 1999); Pasqua v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 101
F.3d 514, 517 (7th Cir. 1996).
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harassers will escape liability. What happened to Karen Holman is no
less injurious simply because a similar wrong was also inflicted on her
husband. The force of the harm to her is not mitigated because the
wrong was also inflicted on another. It is thus counterintuitive that
the force of the legal wrong is not only lessened, but eliminated, because
the harm was also inflicted on another.
Moreover, it is far from clear that Oncale compels this result. The
critical issue,'" the Court stated in Oncale, "'is whether members of
one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of em' 43
ployment to which members of the other sex are not exposed." 1
This does not necessarily mean that no member of the opposite sex
can be exposed to the same disadvantageous condition. Further, the
language in Oncale should not mean that members of the sex opposite
from the plaintiff's must be treated perfectly well. It seems plausible,
even after Oncale, for plaintiffs to urge sex specific injuries in work
environments where members of the opposite sex are exposed to
some kind of abusive treatment.'

44

The recognition that members of both sexes could be discriminatorily harassed existed in at least some circuits pre-Oncale. In Steiner v.
Showboat Operating Co., the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that while a
casino supervisor "was abusive to men and women alike [,. . .] his abusive treatment and remarks to women were of a sexual or gender specific nature."' 14 5 In its defense, Showboat argued that the supervisor's
harassment of men and women, as well as his use of racial epithets,
immunized the casino from liability for sex discrimination. This argu146
ment was unequivocally rejected.

The Seventh Circit also rejected the "equal opportunity harasser" defense in a case prior to Steiner. In McDonnell v. Cisneros, an
earlier sexual harassment case, the Seventh Circuit explained that
"[i]t would be exceedingly perverse if a male worker could buy his
supervisors and his company immunity from Title VII liability by taking care to harass sexually an occasional male worker, though his preferred targets were female."'14 7 Unusually, then, a case many thought
14.
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (quoting Harris
v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)).
144
This point will be discussed more fully infra Part V.B.
145
25 F.3d 1459, 1462 (9th Cir. 1994).
146
Id. at 1464. The court reasoned that
even if [the supervisor] used sexual epithets equal in intensity and in an
equally degrading manner against male employees, he cannot thereby
"cure" his conduct toward women.... The fact that [the supervisor] may
have uttered racially discriminatory slurs only suggests that he was just as
insensitive in matters of race as in those of gender. It in no way excuses his
conduct toward Steiner.
Id. (footnote omitted).
147
84 F.3d 256, 260 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Steiner, 25 F.3d at 1464).
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expanded liability under Title VII, led the Seventh Circuit in Holman to
grant the immunity from liability it previously found "exceedingly
8
perverse."14
Female plaintiffs in hostile' environment cases might also face
greater difficulty post-Oncale. Consider the plight of Linda Ocheltree,
the only female employee in the production shop where she worked
and the plaintiff in Ocheltree v. Scollon Productions, Inc. 149 Ocheltree
complained that her male coworkers used sexually explicit profanity,
pretended to perform oral sex and other sexual acts on a workplace
mannequin, told sexually oriented jokes and graphically described
their sexual exploits. 150 One coworker sang a song for Ocheltree with
lewd lyrics, 151 and several coworkers discussed how their wives and
girlfriends performed oral sex. 152 Specifically, Ocheltree testified that
her coworkers made comments about their female sexual partners

,as to that she swallowed, she gave good head, that I fucked her all
night long,' etc. One employee related that his girlfriend 'gave
good head and that she likes to swallow, that she liked it from behind, that she would do it anywhere with him.' He further said that
' 53
she 'could suck a golf [ball] through a garden hose.
A former employee corroborated Ocheltree's account of the workplace environment and said that various vulgar acts or discussions
154
took place on a daily basis.
Although a jury returned a verdict in favor of Ocheltree, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals set aside the verdict.' 5 5 Interpreting
the "because of" sex requirement as a strict but-for test, the court considered whether Ocheltree would still have been harassed had she
been male.15 6 The court undertook an uncomfortable but exhaustive
analysis of individual comments and incidents to determine whether
they were gender motivated. 157 For example, the majority determined
See Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d. 399, 400-01 (7th Cir. 2000).
308 F.3d 351 (4th Cir. 2002), reh'g en banc granted, vacated, Dec. 16, 2002. A new
opinion is expected to issue in the summer of 2003.
150
Id. at 353-54.
148
149

151
Id. at 354 ("[A] co-worker sang [Ocheltree] a song in which the lyrics were 'come
to me, oh baby, come to me, your breath smells like cum to me."')
152
Id. at 369 (Michael, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment in part).
153
Id. (Michael, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment in part) (cita-

tions omitted) (alteration in original).
154 Id. at 354.
155
Though the Fourth Circuit has since vacated its opinion and reheard the case en
banc, the facts of the case and the court's original analysis provide a useful backdrop for
the discussion in Part V of the shortcomings of the "but-for" test and of the replacement
test urged in this Note.
156 Id. at 356-59.
157

See id.
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that words like "d-khead," "p-ssy," and "blow job," were not "unambiguous [gender] epithet[s].'

'5

3

The lurid conversations about oral sex also failed to persuade the
majority. 159 The dissent found these to be gender motivated because
they portrayed women as sexually subordinate to men and valuable
only as objects "to gratify male desires for oral sex."' 160 The majority
disagreed, however, commenting instead that "the conversations simply depict-in graphic and crude terms-heterosexual sex, including
oral sex. Indeed, the conversations depict the sexual prowess offemales at
least to the same extent as they do males."'"'1 Moreover, working
against Ocheltree was the finding that her coworker's conduct was
"equally offensive to both men and women," as evidenced by the fact
that two of Ocheltree's male coworkers had previously complained to
162
management about the coworkers' harassing conduct.
Only two incidents of harassment were found to satisfy the but-for
test: lewd lyrics sung to Ocheltree, and simulating oral sex on the
mannequin in front of her.163 The rest of the conduct by her coworkers was ultimately brushed aside: "The discussions certainly were sexually explicit.., and while they were generally degrading, humiliating,
and even insulting, they were not aimed solely at females in any
way." 164
Once the court determined that only two incidents of harassment
had occurred "because[ ]of" the plaintiffs sex, it considered only
those incidents in assessing the hostility of the workplace, making it
virtually impossible for Ocheltree to satisfy the severity requirement. 165 Moreover, it borrowed from the Seventh Circuit a peculiarly
strict definition of "hostile" environment, stating that "[t]he workplace that is actionable is the one that is hellish."' 166 Consequently,
158

Id. at 358 (citing Springs v. Diamond Auto Glass, Inc., 242 F.3d 179, 185 (4th Cir.

2001) (alteration in original).
159
1(d.
160 Id. at 374 (Michael, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment in part).
161
Id. at 358 (emphasis added).
162

Id.

163

See id. at 357.

Id. at 357-58. The Fourth Circuit reached a similar result in a same-sex hostile
environment case brought by a male plaintiff, finding that although the conduct was sexual and offensive, it was not directed at males in any particular way. Lack v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 240 F.3d 255, 261-62 (4th Cir. 2001).
164

165

Id. at 359-60.

166 Id. at 359 (quoting Perry v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 126 F.3d 1010, 1013 (7th Cir.
1997). Notice that this standard is significantly stricter than that articulated by the Supreme Court in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993), discussed supra Part I
("So long as the environment would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile
or abusive, there is no need for it also to be psychologically injurious.") (citing Meritor Sav.
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)).
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the majority found Ocheltree's hostile environment claim "not cogni1 67
zable as a matter of law."
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Michael urged a more flexible
"because of" sex requirement, which would be satisfied when the effect of the conduct is "disproportionately more offensive or demeaning to one sex."1

68

This test appears to accord with Oncale, where the

Court provided that "[a] same[ ]sex harassment plaintiff may... offer
direct comparative evidence about how the alleged harasser treated
members of both sexes in a mixed[ ]sex workplace."' 169 If plaintiffs in
same sex harassment cases are permitted to offer such evidence, then
plaintiffs in opposite sex cases should have this option as well. Offering "comparative evidence" does not imply that members of one sex
must bear the full brunt of harassment while members of the other
sex remain relatively unaffected; rather, it implies that the victim simply is treated worse than members of the opposite sex. 170 Consequently,
plaintiffs subjected to a comparative evidence test will fare better than
those subjected to a but-for test.
However, categorically labeling sexual discussions per se as "more
offensive to women" is precarious insofar as it might invite old fashioned stereotypes of female prudery. Indeed, the majority accused
the dissent of just such stereotyping.' 7' Given that Ocheltree was the
only female in the workplace, 172 such discussions under those circumstances could be expected to make the environment more hostile for
her than it would be for the men. 173 Further, the majority's putatively
167

168

Id. at 360.
Id. at 372 (Michael, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment in part)

(citations omitted).
169
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80-81 (1998).
170 The Eighth Circuit took this approach in the same-sex harassment case of Quick v.
Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1379 (8th Cir. 1996) ("[A] fact-finder could reasonably conclude that the treatment of men at Donaldson was worse than the treatment of women.
Thus, Quick has raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the alleged harassmient was gender based.") (citing Kopp v. Samaritan Health Sys., Inc., 13 F.3d 264, 269-70
(8th Cir. 1993)).
171
Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods., Inc., 308 F.3d 351, 363-64 (4th Cir. 2002).
172 Id. at 367 (Michael,J, dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment in part).
173
Id. at 374-75 (Michael, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment in
part) (internal citations omitted). The dissent further noted:
[T]he tone of the discussions in the production shop was hardly one of
mutuality and respect.... Comments like these portray women as sexually
subordinate to men; indeed, it is not too strong to say that the overall tenor
of the workplace banter conveyed the message that women exist primarily
to gratify male desires for oral sex.... When a workplace is suffused with
representations of women as sexual objects, a woman in that workplace
would doubtless wonder whether the primary questions about her in the
minds of her coworkers involved such matters as whether she "swallows" or
whether she could "suck a golf ball through a garden hose."
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"progressive" claim that such discussions actually depict female sexual
prowess simply strains reality.
If the two cases discussed above prove to be representative, female plaintiffs will have greater difficulty establishing sexual harassment claims after Oncale, at least in circuits that read Oncale as
endorsing a strict but-for test. Paradoxically, though Oncale initially
appeared to expand the rights of sexual harassment plaintiffs, it quite
possibly has instead contracted those rights. Further, the post-Oncale
case law illustrates that a gap has formed between the concepts of sexual harassment and sex discrimination. In the next section, this Note
will survey the attempts of several commentators to bridge that gap
and to provide the courts with greater guidance in adjudicating the
new variety of sexual harassment cases.
IV
THEORIZING SEXUAL. HARASSMENT AS SEX DISCRIMINATION

Sexual harassment theory began as the province of feminist scholars such as Catherine MacKinnon, who defined the "wrong" in sexual
harassment as institutionalizing the sexual subordination of women in
the workplace. 174 The paradigmatic example of harassment under
early sexual harassment theory was that of heterosexual male perpetrator and female victim, with the conduct motivated either by particularized sexual desire or by a more generalized desire to sexually
exploit women.1 75 Vicki Schultz dubbed this approach to sexual harassment the "sexual desire-dominance" paradigm. 176 Men harassed
women either because they desired them sexually or wanted to dominate them. Either way, the harassment was clearly "because of" sex
77
and constituted sex discrimination. 1
Schultz criticized this paradigm as preventing courts from recognizing many hostile environment cases of sexual harassment, and as
wrongly directing courts to focus on sexual conduct as the primary
wrong in sexual harassment cases.' 78 For example, in early sexual harassment cases like Harrisv. Forklift Systems, the lower courts considered
only sexual conduct directed at the plaintiff, ignoring overtly discriminatory, but nonsexual conduct by employers, such as denying female
employees benefits routinely given to male employees. 7 1 Empirical
174

S5ee CATHERINE A.

MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF

SEX DISCRIMINATION 9-10

175
sexual
vaded
176

(1979).

Id. at 179 ("[A] sex stereotype is present in the male attitude, expressed through
harassment, that women are sexual beings whose privacy and integrity can be inat will, beings who exist for men's sexual stimulation or gratification.").
Schultz, supra note 49, at 1692-96.
177
MACKINNON, supra note 174, passim.
178 Schultz, supra note 49, at 1710.
179 See id. at 1712.
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research on sexual harassment cases also suggests that plaintiffs alleging harassment including sexual conduct have "significantly higher
win rates" than those who allege nonsexual, sexist conduct. 8 0 According to Schultz, this approach is misguided because "many of the
most prevalent forms of harassment are actions that are designed to
maintain the workplaces-particularly in the more highly rewarded
lines of work-as bastions of masculine competence and authority."' 8
Schultz therefore urges that the "sexual desire-dominance" paradigm of sexual harassment should be replaced by a "competence-centered" paradigm. 82 According to this paradigm, sexual harassment
includes any conduct "that has the purpose or effect of undermining
the perceived or actual competence of women (and some men) who
threaten the idealized masculinity of those who do the work."' 83 Such
an approach could extend protection both to women and to those
men who fail to conform to the idealized masculine stereotype of heterosexuality and machismo. If men want to ensure that their workplaces remain masculine in an attempt to preserve their individual
masculine identities, they will punish those who threaten their image
of the workplace-typically women, homosexuals, and effeminate
men. 8 4 The competence of these categories of workers is then undermined, and their socioeconomic position in society is ultimately
diminished. 18 5 The "competence-centered" paradigm, therefore,
makes sexual conduct neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition
for sexual harassment.
Anita Bernstein has formulated a competing theory of sexual harassment derived from Kantian ethics that attempts to give "content to
the ideal of equality behind Title VII as well as the ideal of individual
autonomy behind dignitary-tort law."'18 6 Treating others as rational,
autonomous agents should both elicit and prohibit certain behavior.
People ought to refrain from interfering with the autonomy of others
in certain ways, and ought to help them fully realize their autonomy if
it is hindered by external conditions. Bernstein explains the prohib180

181
182
183
184
185

Juliano & Schwab, supra note 41, at 580.
Schultz, supra note 49, at 1687.
Jd. at 1755-74.
Id. at 1762 (footnote omitted).
See id. at 1762-69.
Id. at 1761. Schultz further notes:

[Bly portraying women as less than equal at work, men can secure superior
jobs, resources and influence-all of which afford men leverage over women at home and everyplace else. Work and workplace relations are active
shapers of gender difference and identity, and harassment is a central
mechanism through which men preserve their work and skill as domains of
masculine mastery.
Id. (footnote omitted).
186
Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, II1 HARV. L. REV. 446, 450
(1997).
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ited behavior in terms of three "duties to refrain [:]" (1) from treating
another as a mere means of achieving one's own ends, (2) from humiliating another, and (3) from denying the autonomy and "self-conception" of another. 87 Sexual harassment involves the violation of at
least one of these duties.' 8 Bernstein sees the advantage of this approach as moving courts' scrutiny away from victims and toward the
harassers, who lack the fundamental respect for persons qua rational,
autonomous agents.18 9 Thus, according to Bernstein, sexual harassment should not be viewed simply through the lens of gender, but as a
fundamental moral wrong.
Not surprisingly, what Bernstein identifies as the main advantage
of her approach others cite as a disadvantage. Kathryn Abrams has
criticized Bernstein for neglecting to consider "that the humiliation of
sexual harassment is perpetrated by more powerful members of a
gendered hierarchy against the less powerful members."'1 1 Why
should we view sexual harassment as a uniquely "gendered" wrong
rather than as one instance of a more generalized moral wrong?
Abrams offers two reasons in reply. First, she claims that locating the
wrong of sexual harassment within "a context of systematic gender
inequality" makes it a societal, rather than individual wrong, which
increases the "imperative for responding to it."''
Second, she claims
that focusing on the individual rather than the gendered wrong of
harassment makes it more difficult to take preventive and remedial
measures.

192

Abrams's account essentially combines the views of both MacKinnon and Schultz. She sees sexual harassment as an attempt to entrench masculine norms and preserve male control in the
workplace.' 91 Like Schultz, Abrams sees this entrenchment as impacting both men and women by masculinizing men and feminizing
women. 1'9 Also, like both MacKinnon and Schultz, Abrams sees the
consequence of sexual harassment as the socioeconomic subordination of women, because harassment victims often perform below capacity at their jobs or seek inferior employment as a way of avoiding
harassment. 95 Based on her conception of the "wrong" of sexual har187

Id. at 487.

188

See id. at 487-92.

189

Id. at 492-97.

190

Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudenceof Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REV.

1169, 1185 (1998).
191

Id. at 1187.

192

id.

19-1 See id. at 1205-20.
194
See id. at 1218-19.

1'95 See id. at 1217-20.
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assment, Abrams interprets the "because of sex" requirement as "'connected with the enforcement of a sex and gender hierarchy.' "196
Abrams identifies several ways that harassment, or the entrenching of male norms, can occur. The most flagrant way is
through physical aggression or persistent verbal harassment, which
sends unequivocal signals that women are not welcome in the workplace. 197 Another way is to sexualize or overly feminize' 98 women in
the workplace, thereby demeaning their work related qualities and
sending the message that women are only valued as objects of male
desire in the workplace. 199 Abrams believes both of these types of harassment have a negative impact on women because they elevate masculine norms at the expense of feminine norms. Other, more subtle
forms of harassment include devaluing women who perform traditionally feminine tasks and creating workplace environments in which sexually predatory behavior or roughhousing flourishes. 20°1 All of these

actions interfere with the agency of women, according to Abrams, and
20 1
so constitute sexual harassment.
Katherine Franke has developed a theory of sexual harassment
similar to that of Abrams. 20 2 Like Abrams, Franke sees sexual harassment as a means of perpetuating gender hierarchies and therefore
defines sexual harassment in broad terms. 203 In fact, Franke describes
one of the goals of Title VII as providing "all people more options
with respect to how they do their gender."' 2 0 4 Consequently, she views
sexual harassment as sex discrimination "because of the gender norms
it reflects and perpetuates." 20 5 In particular, the norm perpetuated is
that of "hetero-patriarchy," meaning that sexual harassment is used as
a tool to elevate heterosexual, masculine values and to devalue those
individuals who deviate from the norm. 20 6 Thus, Franke calls sexual
harassment a "technology of sexism," but simply means that it is a tool
for perpetuating hetero-normative ideals and regulating gender behavior. 20 7 It is this "by means of" relationship between sexual harassment and sexism that makes sexual harassment "because of" sex. 20

8

196

Id. at 1223.

197

Id. at 1206.

198

An example of such treatment would be the use of "pet names" by male workers for

the female employees.
199 See id. at 1207-08.
200
Id. at 1209-10.
201
See id. at 1219-20.
202
Franke, supra note 36, at 693-94.
203
See id. at 696.
204
Id. at 758.
205
Id. at 693.
206
See id. at 763.
207
See id. at 762-71.
208
See id.
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One difference between Franke and Abrams-which Franke
identifies as a strength-is that, according to Franke, the wrong in
harassing gay or effeminate men does not derive from the subordination of women. 2119 In other words, subordination theories like
Abrams's must maintain that gay or effeminate men are harassed because they are regarded in the same manner as women and thus must
be subordinated as women are subordinated. 2 0 In contrast, Franke
places all these forms of harassment on the same level. Each form of
harassment is merely one instance of a more general wrong: further21
ing the gender hierarchy. '
The above theorists share a repudiation of the assumption that
sexual conduct in the workplace is per se sexual harassment, thereby
distancing themselves from Catherine MacKinnon. 2 12 This repudiation might be partly a response to the apparent overemphasis of sexual conduct by the courts, which has worked to the detriment of
female plaintiffs bringing hostile environment claims based on nonsexual conduct.2 13 An additional worry about identifying sexual conduct in the workplace as inherently wrong or harassing is that it
stereotypes women as passive or prudish victims. 2 14

Thus, while

Franke, Schultz, and Abrams focus on how sexual conduct can be
used to further certain wrongs, they reject the notion that sexual con2 15
duct in the workplace is itself inherently wrong.
Rosa Ehrenreich has taken a different approach to sexual harassment that does not attempt to fit all sexual harassment under the rubric of sex discrimination.2 16 On the contrary, Ehrenreich criticizes
the scholarly literature on sexual harassment for conceptualizing sex209
See id. at 762-63.
210
See id. at 761 & n.373 (quoting Kathryn Abrams, Title VI and the Complex Female
Subject, 92 Mic:n. L. REV. 2479, 2516 (1994)).
211
Id. at 762-63. Franke criticizes the subordination theory, stating that
[u]nderlying [the subordination theory ofi gendered inferiority is an ideology that is designed to reduce women to victimized, highly sexual, less competent sub-humans who do not enjoy full agency.... But the net effect of
this kind of conduct extends beyond any particular case in that it solidifies
what 'real men' and 'real women' should be.
Id. at 762-63.
212 See Schultz, supra note 49, at 1689, 1755; Abrams, supra note 190, at 1213-14;
Franke, supra note 36, at 746.
213 See Schultz, supra note 49, at 1689.
214
See Franke, supra note 36, at 746-47.
215

In contrast, David Schwartz has urged a return to the "sex per se" rule, which holds

that sexual conduct per se establishes the causation requirement in Title VII. Schwartz's
proposal, however, addresses the need for a bright-line rule in sexual harassment cases
rather than the fundamental wrong of sexual harassment. See David S. Schwartz, Wien Is
Sex Because ofSex? The CausationIProblem in Sexual HarassmentLaw, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1697,

1782-87 (2002).
216
See Rosa Ehrenreich, Dignity and Discrinination:Toward a Pluralistic Understandingof
Workplace Harassment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1 (1999).

2003]

SEXUAL HARRASSMENT

1777

ual harassment as a gendered harm, which she says conflates "the nature of the harm of harassment,which is a dignitary harm, and the context
'21 7
in which the harassment occurs, which is a context of discrimination."
Ehrenreich's conception of a dignitary harm is similar to the lack of
respect for personal autonomy discussed by Bernstein and as such,
dignitary harm is not a uniquely gendered wrong.2 18 Rather, it is a
harm one suffers qua human being, not qua woman. 21 9 But the context of the workplace-where the harm is inflicted-is one imbued
with a history of discrimination against women. 22 0 As such, the victim
of sexual harassment suffers in the workplace qua woman, but suffers
22 1
the actual injury qua human being.
Distinguishing the harm from the context of its occurrence leads
Ehrenreich to argue that while all workplace harassment should be
2
actionable as a tort, it should not all be actionable under Title VII.22
Ehrenreich reminds the reader that Title VII essentially protects women from sex discrimination and is ill equipped to handle male victims of sexual harassment. 22 3 However, she adds that many of the
claims that cannot be brought under Title VII can be brought as common law tort claims such as assault, battery, invasion of privacy, false
imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 224 For
plaintiffs bringing such claims, Ehrenreich argues that courts should
treat the fact that the conduct occurs in the workplace as an aggravat225
ing factor.
Comparing the approaches of Bernstein and Ehrenreich with
those of Abrams, Schultz and Franke, we face a basic choice of
whether to view gender as an essential or as an accidental part of the
wrong in sexual harassment cases. Abrams, Schultz and Franke all
217
218

Id. at 3.
See id. at 22; Bernstein, supra note 186, at 450. Ehrenreich further notes:

While the common-law notion of harm to one's dignity or personality interests may not bear intense philosophical scrutiny, its core assumptions are
clear enough: all individuals share in "personhood," are autonomous and
unique, and are entitled to be treated with respect. Actions that would humiliate, torment, threaten, intimidate, pressure, demean, frighten, outrage,
or injure a reasonable person are actions that can be said to injure an individual's dignitary interests and, if sufficiently severe, can give rise to causes
of action in tort.
Ehrenreich, supra note 216, at 22 (footnote omitted).
219
See Ehrenreich, supra note 216, at 22.
220
See id. at 16.
221
See id.
222
See id. at 27-39.
223
See id. at 35-36.
224
See id. at 36-44.
225
Id. at 44-52. Thus, for a plaintiff suing to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a tort that requires the defendant's conduct be "outrageous," courts should
consider occurrence in the workplace as enhancing the outrageousness of the conduct. See
id. at 46-47.

1778

CORNELL LAW RVIEW

[Vol. 88:1750

view sexual harassment as some sort of attempt to police or enforce a
gender hierarchy. Therefore, gender is an essential property of the
normative wrong of sexual harassment. In contrast, Bernstein and
Ehrenreich view sexual harassment as one manifestation of a more
fundamental wrong-the invasion of another's autonomy. Thus, they
view gender as an accidental property of the normative wrong of sexual harassment.
This choice is important because it potentially affects the scope of
cases one deems as within the purview of Title VII. If sexual harassment is wrong essentially because it elevates hetero-patriarchy, homosexual and effeminate men might be included as among the victims
who can sue under Title VII. If, on the other hand, sexual harassment
is an invasion of another's autonomy that just happens to be directed
at some victims because of their sex, the class of Title VII plaintiffs
might be limited to women and to male victims of homosexual
harassers.
The foregoing discussion is also important as a framework for assessing the adequacy of any "because of" sex test. An adequate test
should not only be workable for courts, but it also should comport
with our basic intuitions about the normative wrong in sexual harassment. Although the author is more sympathetic to the views of
Abrams, Schultz and Franke than those of Bernstein and Ehrenreich,
the aim of this Note is not to defend any particular normative theory.
Rather, the aim in the next section is to propose and defend a workable test that also accommodates the "gendered wrong" intuition by
selecting for those instances of offensive conduct that promote
hetero-patriarchy.
V
SEXUAL HARASSMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE

A. The Failure of the But-For Test
The but-for test, standing alone, is insufficient as a test for harassment or discrimination. 22" The reasons, as is evident from the case
discussions in Part III, are that a but-for test is ambiguous, overly simplistic, too weak, and too strong.
The test is too weak because, when applied, it finds causal connections where intuitively there are none.22 7 For example, in many
sexual harassment cases, the harassment would not have occurred but
226 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 282 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
("Common-law approaches to causation often require proof of but-for cause as a starting
point toward proof of legal cause."), superseded 6y statute as stated in Stender v. Lucky Stores,
Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1302, 1305 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
227 For example, one's birth is a but-for cause of every event that occurs in one's lifetime. Had one not been born, one could not have done any of the things one has in fact
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for the victim's age-or some other quality-and yet it would be incorrect to say the harassment occurred because of age. Consider again an
example of an effeminate man who is harassed because he is effeminate. Intuitively, this is a case of gender harassment: targeting a man
for abuse because he does not conform to the stereotypically masculine norm the harasser values. In short, he was harassed because of his
gendered identity (effeminate male), not because of his sex.
However, a court might also find that the victim was harassed because of his sex. After all, had the victim been female, he would not be
faulted for failing to conform to a stereotypically masculine norm.
Further, had the male victim been a child, he also would not be subject to harassment because males are typically held to stricter gender
roles during and after adolescence. But intuitively, the harassment
does not occur because of age, and no court would (or should) find
this to be a case of age discrimination. Thus, the but-for test alone
sweeps too broad a range of conduct under the rubric of sexual
harassment.
The but-for test is also too strong (i.e., underinclusive) given the
case discussions in Part III. Classic tort cases illustrate this underinclusiveness in situations of causal overdetermination-that is, where two
or more events jointly produce a certain effect.2

28

In the sexual har-

assment context, where harassment occurs because of both a generalized desire to be crass as well as gender animus, the generalized
crassness diverts the court's attention from the gender animus, as occurred in Ocheltree.
A third problem with the but-for test is its ambiguity. In asking
whether conduct would have occurred but for the victim's sex, one
might mean at least two different things. 229 First, one might mean
that a particular act would not have had the same effect on the victim,
but for his or her sex. This is the roughly the interpretation urged by
Judge Michael in his dissenting opinion in Ocheltree, where he suggested that certain acts can be "disproportionately more offensive or
done in one's lifetime. However, intuitively, one's birth is not the cause of one's going to
law school.
228
See, e.g.,
Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 5 (Cal. 1948) (holding that, when two
hunters negligently fired guns in the direction of a third hunter injured nearby, both
could be treated as liable); Kingston v. Chi. & N.W. Ry. Co., 211 N.W. 913, 915 (Wis. 1927)
(explaining that each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire damage where separate acts
of negligence concur in producing injury, and either would have produced such damage
alone).
229
This ambiguity might simply mirror the ambiguity inherent in the concept of "discrimination." When we say that someone was discriminated against as a woman, we might
mean that she was harmed in a sex-specific way, or that someone sought to punish her by
virtue of her femaleness. The replacement test I propose infra Part V.B attempts to accommodate both the intent-oriented and effect-oriented intuitions that exist regarding the
concept of discrimination.
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demeaning to one sex."' 23' Also, the Seventh Circuit, in Doe ex rel. Doe
v. City of Belleville, appeared to adopt this version of the test, at least
when the complained of conduct involves sexual touching:
[W]hen a woman's breasts are grabbed or when her buttocks are
pinched, the harassment necessarily is linked to her gender.... It
would not seem to matter that the harasser might simultaneously be
harassing a male co[ ]worker with comparable epithets and comparable physical molestation. When a male employee's testicles are
grabbed, his torment might be comparable, but the point is that he
experiences that harassment as a man, notjust as a worker, and she
as a woman. In each case, the victim's gender not only supplies the
lexicon of the harassment, it affects how he or she will experience
23
that harassment. '
In Doe, the Seventh Circuit took the additional step of using the
effect of the harassment as an indicator of the harasser's discriminatory intent, saying, "[f] rankly, we find it hard to think of a situation in
which someone intentionally grabs another's testicles for reasons en2 32
tirely unrelated to that person's gender."
The second meaning that we might give to the but-for test is that
the desire to harasswould not have arisen but for the sex of the victim.
This is the approach the majority of the Fourth Circuit apparently
adopted in its now vacated opinion in Ocheltree.233 The court focused
on the totality of the offensive conduct occurring in the workplace to
determine whether the desire to torment Ocheltree would have existed had she been male. 23 4 Finding that so much of the offensive conduct was of a generalized nature, the court concluded that the desire
to engage in the complained of conduct would have existed even if
2 35
Ocheltree had been male. The Sixth Circuit also favored the intent oriented interpretation
in Harbert-Yeargin,Inc., but its application illustrates the clumsiness of
the but-for test. 23 6 Clearly, the complained of conduct in that casetesticle grabbing 23 7-could only be directed at men. Therefore, the
court's finding that the but-for test was not satisfied indicates that it
looked to employer intent. Specifically, the court considered whether
230

Ocheltree Prods., Inc. v. Scollon, 308 F.3d 351, 372 (2002) (Michael, J. dissenting

in part and concurring in the judgment in part) (citations omitted), reh'g en banc granted,
opinion vacated, Dec. 16, 2002.
231
119 F.3d 563, 578 (7th Cir. 1997) (internal citations omitted), vacated by 523 U.S.
1001 (1998).
2_32 Id. at 580.
233 See Ochetree, 308 F.3d at 356-59.
234 See id.
235
See id. at 359.
2316 See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Harbert-Yeargin, Inc., 266 F.3d 498
(6th Cir. 2001); supra notes 119-35 and accompanying text.
237 See id. at 501-03.
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the conduct was motivated either by sexual desire or by hostility to
men in the workplace. 23 8 Concluding that the supervisor's conduct
was motivated by neither, the court appeared to regard as irrelevant
whether the intent was gender specific for some other reason.
Notice how the ambiguities of the but-for test emerge in the possible approaches to the conduct at issue in Harbert-Yeargin,Inc. On the
one hand, one might say that a man cannot have his testicles grabbed
but for his sex, thereby finding the conduct satisfies the result oriented
interpretation of the but-for test. On the other hand, one might find
that the conduct was motivated by either desire for or animus toward
men, thereby satisfying the intent oriented interpretation of the butfor test. But there are at least two additional, and plausible, interpretations of the conduct at issue.
One might argue that the overall context of the workplace suggested that the supervisor was bullying and teasing everyone equally,
and simply found testicle-grabbing a convenient way of bothering the
men. In other words, perhaps the victim's sex motivated the form, but
not the occurrence, of the harassment. The desire to harass by some
means might have existed regardless of the victim's sex. It is unclear
whether a court would find the but-for test satisfied under these circumstances. Alternatively, even if the supervisor's intent to harass was
directed only at men, perhaps the intent arose neither from desire
nor animus, but rather out of an innocuous, but mistaken, belief that
the conduct really was "horseplay" and that men would understand
this. The majority appears to endorse this last reading, thereby applying an intent oriented interpretation of the but-for test, but with the
added requirement that the intent include gender based desire or
2 39
animus.
Even assuming the Sixth Circuit reached the right result using
the but-for test in Harbert-Yeargin, it should be increasingly clear that
the test can be read in a variety of ways, leading to unpredictable results and providing little guidance. A superior test would avoid conflating the intent and effect of harassing conduct, and would clarify
the role of gender based animus in harassment.
238 See id. at 521 (Guy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the
error in the jury instructions at the trial level). As explained supra notes 230-31 and accompanying text, the Seventh Circuit, at least pre-Oncale, interpreted the "but-for" test differently. See Doe ex rel. Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated by 523
U.S. 1001 (1998). In Doe, the Seventh Circuit indicated that when one's sexual organs are
grabbed, they are grabbed because of that person's sex, and the victim suffers a sex specific
harm. See id. at 587-88. However, Doe was a gender stereotyping case, so it is unclear how
the Seventh Circuit would rule on a case such as Harbert-Yeargin,Inc., which did not involve
any element of gender stereotyping.
239
See Harbeit-Yeargin, Inc., 266 F.3d at 521 (GuyJ., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
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Finally, the language of Price Waterhouse, which has been largely
ignored, makes clear that reading the "because of" sex requirement as
a but-for test is overly simplistic. In interpreting the relevant provision
of Title VII, Justice Brennan, writing for a four Justice plurality, explained that "[w] e take these words to mean that gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions. To construe the words 'because of' as
colloquial shorthand for 'but-for causation,' as does Price
Waterhouse, is to misunderstand them.

'240

The plurality held that if

an employee shows but-for cause, she prevails, but the Court rejected
the contention that the employee must show but-for cause. 2 4'

It fur-

ther explained that "the words 'because of do not mean 'solely because of.'"242 In other words, the Price Waterhouse plurality regarded
the but-for test as a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition for satisfying the "because of" sex requirement. It also indicated concern that
the simplistic but-for test would mislead courts into assuming that sex
must be the sole motivating factor in the harassment. 24 3
In short, the main problems with the but-for test-that it violates
the language of Price Waterhouse, and that it is simultaneously ambiguous, too strong, and too weak-warrant consideration of a replacement. The following section proposes an interpretation of the
"because of" sex requirement that replaces the but-for test, and analyzes the fates of a variety of cases under the new approach.
B.

When Sexual Harassment Is "Because of" Sex
1.

The New Test

In place of the but-for interpretation of the "because-of" sex requirement, this Note proposes a conjunctive, two pronged test that is
both intent oriented and result oriented in relating sex to sexual har240 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 (1989) (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted), superseded by statute as stated in Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 780 F. Supp.
1302, 1305 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
241
Id. at 240 n.6; see also id. at 241 n.7 ("Congress specifically rejected an amendment
that would have placed the word 'solely' in front of the words 'because of."') (citing 110
CONG. REc. 2728, 13837 (1964)).
242
Id. at 241. The Court further noted:
When, therefore, an employer considers both gender and legitimate factors
at the time of making a decision, that decision was 'because of' sex and the
other, legitimate considerations-even if we may say later, in the context of
litigation, that the decision would have been the same if gender had not
been taken into account.
Id. Justice O'Connor, concurring in the judgment, worried that the plurality's approach
allowed a cause of action where considerations of gender merely "tainted" the decision,
and instead would require gender to be a "substantial factor" or a "motivating factor" in
the challenged employment decision. Id. at 275-78 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
243
See, e.g., Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods., Inc., 308 F.3d 351, 362 (4th Cir. 2002) ("[T]he
inquiry is always whether 'but for' the plaintiff's gender, the harassment would not have
occurred . . ."), reh'g en banc granted, opinion vacated, Dec. 16, 2002.
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assment. In determining whether the complained of conduct was "because[ ]of" sex, courts should ask:
(1) whether it was foreseeable, under the circumstances, that the
victim would suffer harm 244 by the conduct, given the sex of
the individual; 24 5 and
(2) whether the victim's sex was a motivating factor in the harassing
246
conduct.
To satisfy the "because of" sex requirement, a plaintiff must establish both prongs of the Motivating Factor and Foreseeability (MFF)
test. However, in some circumstances, a plaintiff will be able to show
the first prong quite easily, but will be unable to show the second by
any direct evidence. Therefore, this Note proposes the following additional inquiry.
Once a plaintiff establishes the first prong, the court should then
consider whether a reasonablemember of the victim's sex would think the complained of conduct conveyed a discriminatory message. If so, the court may
infer that the second prong is satisfied as well. This helps plaintiffs in
hostile work environments that promote hetero-patriarchy, but the
prevalence of generalized, lewd behavior makes it difficult to establish
discriminatory intent in a straightforward way.
To see how this works, consider an all male workplace in which
the men discuss their female sexual partners in graphic detail, portraying them as eager sex objects. Suppose they discuss hard core pornographic movies and comment that all women should perform
sexually as porn stars do. Further, imagine they hang pornographic
images in the workplace, listen to sexually explicit and sexist programs
on the radio, and frequently make derogatory remarks about women
in conversations with one another. Suppose this conduct continues
after a female employee joins the workplace, although the men do not
specifically address the female employee in their conversations. She
complains that the conversations disturb her, and that she detests going to work and listening to them. The men protest that "it's nothing
personal," and remind her that they have always engaged in such
conduct.
244
The "harm" is here construed as it commonly is understood in the sexual harassment case law, that is, the harm need not be economic, but rather, it may be emotional or
psychological.
245
It is important to remember that this test only replaces the causal requirement in
Title VII cases. Thus, a defendant will not face liability unless additional elements, such as
those discussed supra Part I, are also present. Henceforth, this test will be referred to as the
"MFF test"-Motivating Factor and Foreseeability.
246 Recall that the "motivating factor" interpretation of the "because of" sex requirement was endorsed by Justice O'Connor in Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 275-78 (O'Connor,
J.,concurring).
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Our hypothetical female employee could not prevail in a sexual
harassment suit under the but for test, nor could she satisfy the "motivating factor" prong of the MFF test with direct proof of discrimination based on sex. She could, however, establish that the conduct
foreseeably harmed her, given her sex, particularly after she made her
discomfort known. Once she does so, she can subsequently argue that
a reasonable woman would find that the overall conduct conveyed a
message of discrimination. In this case, the overall work environment
strongly suggests that either women are not welcome or that they are
valued primarily as sexual subordinates. If the court agrees, it may
then infer that the second prong was established as a result.
Consequently, the fact that the offensive conduct occurred
before the female employee arrived does not affect the MFF test as it
would the but-for test. This is as it should be. To illustrate, imagine
an all white workplace comprised of members of the Ku Klux Klan
who engaged in racist discussions, listened to racist radio programs,
and so forth. Suppose that an African American employee then
joined the workplace, and that the offensive conduct continued. It
seems reasonable to suppose that the new employee would suffer foreseeable harm given his race. It is also reasonable to infer that the
overall workplace environment conveyed a message of discrimination-in this case, a message of white supremacy. Therefore, a court
should be able to infer that the offended employee suffered harassment "because of" his race. In short, the employee would satisfy the
MFF test.
However, he would fail to satisfy the but-for test. In asking
whether, but for the employee's race, the complained of conduct
would have occurred, the court would look to the state of the workplace when all the employees were white. Given that the same behavior occurred in the all white workplace, the employee's claim would
fail. This is an absurd result. Where the environment projects a hostile racial hierarchy, and it is clearly foreseeable that an African American employee will suffer psychological injury given his race, the
employee should have a cause of action for race based harassment.
The same principle applies in sexual harassment cases where a
female employee joins the all male workplace. The fact that lewd,
hetero-patriarchal behavior occurred previously should not immunize
the workplace from liability. The men in the workplace might find it
amusing or entertaining that the new female employee finds their
conduct offensive, even if they would have engaged in such discussions had she not joined the workforce. Simply put, the female plaintiffs sex might "add to the fun" of such conduct, given that the male
employees know that their actions bother her, but persist regardless.
In short, the female employee deserves a cause of action in this situa-
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tion because the male employees know, or should know, that they are
harming her in a sex specific way.
To reiterate, if a plaintiff can show foreseeable, sex specific harm
and that a reasonable member of her sex would find that the offensive
conduct conveyed a discriminatory message, the court may infer that
sex was a motivating factor in the harassment. This allows the plaintiff
to satisfy the MFF test in cases where more direct proof of discriminatory intent is difficult due to the generalized coarseness of the workplace. Therefore, while a plaintiff must satisfy both the "intent" and
"effect" prongs of the MFF test, she has available an evidentiary shortcut to satisfying the intent prong.
Note, too, that the harm under the foreseeability prong should
be judged from the perspective of a reasonable member of the victim's sex under the circumstances. But "under the circumstances" is
an important qualification. For instance, if the victim is singled out as
a woman and subjected to harassing conduct, it is more likely to suffer
foreseeable harm as a woman by additional, generalized crass behavior. Similarly, if the victim is the only woman in the workplace, it is
more likely that the harasser(s) could foresee that they would harm
her with lurid discussions of sex than if the workplace were half female and the women themselves engaged in such discussions. Further, if the victim complains about the conduct, she will more likely
suffer foreseeable harm. In most cases, therefore, the relevant cir-

cumstances to consider are whether the victim was greatly outnumbered by members of the opposite sex, whether other conduct
intentionally targeted the victim as a woman or as a man, and whether
the victim complained about the conduct.
As discussed earlier, a plaintiff in a hostile environment case must
meet two evidentiary burdens: she must show that she encountered
harassment because of her sex, and that the sex specific conduct was
severe and pervasive enough to constitute a hostile and offensive
working environment. Thus, a plaintiff can base her claim only upon
that conduct which meets the severity requirement. In Ocheltree, only
two instances of conduct were determined to satisfy the "because of"
requirement, and those two, standing alone, were insufficient to show
severity and pervasiveness. 247 Because the MFF test allows plaintiffs to
use a broader range of conduct in meeting the causal requirement,
they obviously can avail themselves of a broader range of conduct in
meeting the severity requirement as well.
Applying the MFF test would therefore have produced a different
result in the Ocheltree case. Some of the actions by Ocheltree's coworkers and supervisor, such as simulating sex acts with a mannequin in
247

See Ocheltree, 308 F.3d at 359.
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Ocheltree's presence and singing a lewd song about her, were directed at her as a woman, and the many more instances of generalized
harassing conduct foreseeably harmed her as a woman. 248 The generalized conduct undoubtedly contributed to the hostility of the work
environment in Ocheltree. Nevertheless, the court discounted this conduct in deciding Ocheltree's claim, both because it found that much
of it would have occurred had Ocheltree been male, and because it
resisted the assumption that some conduct and conversations are inherently more offensive to women than to men. 249 In contrast, under
the MFF test, Ocheltree could proceed by showing (1) that the generalized conduct foreseeably harmed her as a woman, and (2) that a
reasonable woman would find that the overall conduct conveyed a
message of discrimination. After all, as the dissent pointed out, the
comments by Ocheltree's coworkers
portray[ed] women as sexually subordinate to men ...

[and] con-

veyed the message that women exist primarily to gratify male desires
for oral sex ....

When a workplace is suffused with representations

of women as sexual objects, a woman in that workplace would
doubtless wonder whether the primary questions about her in the
minds of her coworkers involved such matters as whether she "swallows" or whether she could "suck a golf ball through a garden
250
hose."
Again, once Ocheltree showed foreseeable, sex specific harm and
a discriminatory message within the generalized conduct, the court
could infer that the first prong of the MFF test was satisfied. Consequently, Ocheltree could satisfy the severity requirement by marshalling as evidence the generalized conduct that satisfied the MFF test
but was excluded under the but-for test.
Clearly, the MFF test is both more plaintiff friendly and produces
more just results than the but-for test now used in typical hostile environment cases. The unfortunate result in Ocheltree was that, once
again, the supervisor and coworkers could escape liability by subjecting all employees, both male and female, to lurid sexual discussions.
The workplace environment described in Ocheltree is probably typical
of the workplace environments in many sexual harassment cases. It is
unlikely, after all, that those who harass women in the workplace treat
25
their male coworkers with complete civility. '

See supra notes 150-73 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
250
Ocheltree, 308 F.3d at 374-75 (Michael, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the
judgment in part).
251
Studies by psychologist John Pryor suggest that men who sexually harass are also
more likely to rape, are less empathetic, more authoritarian, and more accepting of interpersonal violence than their non-harassing peers. See Franke, supra note 36, at 742-43 &
nn.265-69 (discussing the work of Pryor as well as several other psychologists who have
248
249
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It is evident that plaintiffs laboring under the but-for regime who
can use only the evidence of harassment specifically directed at them to
meet the severity requirement are doubly disadvantaged. Not only are
they barred from using evidence of coarse and offensive conduct directed at everyone in support of their hostile environment claim, but
such evidence will be employed by defendants against plaintiffs to undermine a showing of the causal requirement.
The MFF test eliminates this evidentiary disadvantage by allowing
the plaintiff to use evidence of generalized harassment in establishing
the severity of the conduct when it foreseeably harms the plaintiff,
given her sex. At the same time, this test does not threaten to turn
Title VII into a "civility code" for the workplace. 252 Plaintiffs cannot
use merely crass conduct to meet the severity requirement. Where sex
is not clearly a motivating factor in the conduct, plaintiffs must still
show foreseeable, sex specific harm and a discriminatory message in
the conduct.
2.

Application of the Test to "Horseplay" and "Equal Opportunity
Harasser" Cases

Consider next the application of the MFF test to those cases involving men "goosing" and "bagging" other men in the workplace, as
in Harbert-Yeargin, Inc. 253 Where only men in the workplace are

harassed, plaintiffs could likely satisfy the second prong of the MFF
test. A more difficult task for plaintiffs, however, would be satisfying
the first prong. On the one hand, one might argue that the plaintiff
suffered foreseeable harm as a man because only men have testicles,
so only men can suffer harm by "bagging." The oddity of this result,
however, forces a clarification of how harm should be understood.
Because this is a Title VII action, the harm suffered should be
related to some sort of gender specific message: one is merely a sex
object in the workplace, or one is unwelcome in the workplace. In
short, one suffers harm because he reasonably reads a discriminatory
message into the conduct. Notice that if one does reasonably read such
a message into the conduct, or does suffer foreseeable harm, the existence of actual animus on the part of the harasser is irrelevant.
To illustrate, suppose that female employees in the same workplace were also "goosed" and had their breasts grabbed by the supervisor. Essentially, they encountered the same degree of abusive conduct
studied the "factors, dynamics, and proclivities that make a man likely to sexually harass
women with whom he works or studies.").
252 The Supreme Court addressed this persistent worry in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998). The Court found that such a fear would be
adequately avoided by carefully following the statutory requirements.
253 See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Harbert-Yeargin, Inc., 266 F.3d 498
(6th Cir. 2001); see supra notes 119-35 and accompanying text.
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as the men, but each of the employees was harassed in a sex specific
way. Should any of these employees be able to sue for sexual harassment, and if so, which ones? Four options present themselves: (1) no
one, (2) only the women, (3) only the men, and (4) both the men
and the women. The worst option is, of course, the first. Unfortunately, the but-for test would dictate precisely this result, effectively
allowing no Title VII remedy for employees that face sexual assault at
work. Again, under the but-for test, had the supervisor harassed only
the women, surely the women would recover. However, because the
supervisor "bags" the male workers in addition to the female workers,
he effectively immunizes himself from liability.
The third option makes little sense, given that both men and women were harassed. Also, one might think that the women are more
likely to feel offended by such conduct, given that they might construe
it as a discriminatory attempt to reduce them to sex objects. But even
if one does not accept this additional proposition, there is no reason
to bar a cause of action by the women while allowing one for the men.
The fourth option is a possibility, though perhaps an unlikely
one, given that both men and women have to allege sex discrimination when they were subjected to similar forms of harassment. This is
not to suggest that it would never be possible for both men and women in the same workplace to sue under Title VII for sexual harassment. One can imagine a workplace in which a male supervisor
conditioned the employment of his male employees on their responding to his sexual advances, and spoke to the female employees using
sexually derogatory terms. In effect, the supervisor subjects the men to
quid pro quo harassment, and the women to hostile environment harassment. In such a case both the female and the male employees
might reasonably bring suit, given that each group faces sex discrimination in different ways. Therefore, although the claims of both the
men and the women might not ultimately succeed, the fourth option
is a possibility, and one allowed by the MFF test.
Another possibility, and perhaps the best option, is the second,
which allows only the women to bring suit. While either group may be
able to show that their sex was a motivating factor in the harassment,
the women are especially likely to be able to show foreseeable harm
given their sex. Again, the women quite reasonably might construe
the grabbing of their breasts not as mere horseplay, but as a proposition or as an attempt to reduce them to sex objects. Ultimately, this
will be an issue for the jury, but under the MFF test, female employees
at least have a cause of action, whereas under the but-for test such
claims would likely fail as a matter of law.
The second and fourth options not only find support from the
MFF test, but they also comport with the disparate treatment language
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in Oncale. As explained earlier, the Oncale decision did not compel
acceptance of the equal opportunity harasser defense, but rather allowed comparative evidence of how both sexes are treated in a mixed
sex workplace. 25 4 Even after Oncale, as long as victims can produce
evidence of sex specific harm, their claims should not fail as a matter
of law simply because both males and females are harmed.
Thus far this Note has demonstrated the superiority of the MFF
test over the but-for test in hostile environment cases, but the test
must also be compared in the context of quid pro quo cases. In the
typical opposite sex quid pro quo case, plaintiffs will prevail under
either the but-for or the MFF test. However, the but-for test utterly
fails for plaintiffs in Holman-style cases. 255 Indeed, any test would
likely falter in such cases. The MFF test, however, might provide a
glimmer of hope to some plaintiffs if they can show that members of
their sex were the preferred targets. While the existence of a single
victim of the opposite sex is likely to negate causation for the plaintiff
under the but-for test, the same cannot be said under the MFF test.
Therefore, although the MFF test will not allow members of both
sexes to sue in Holman-style cases, the MFF test can at least allow a
cause of action for members of the preferred sex if members of one
sex appear to be the preferred targets.
3.

Application of the MVFF Test to Gender Stereotyping Cases

Finally, consider gender stereotyping harassment cases. Admittedly, there is reasonable hesitation surrounding the viability of gender stereotyping claims under Title VII. One might think that
problems of proof will abound in such causes of action. What, after
all, should be included in the concept of gender? 256 Is it part of the
See supra text accompanying note 76.
255
Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399 (7th Cir. 2000); see supra notes 136-42 and accompanying text.
256 Susan Estrich has written about "the comfort factor"-a combination of traits that
make people comfortable with one's appearance, personality, and leadership ability-that
predicts which men and women will rise to high positions in their professions. See SUSAN
EsTRICH, SEX AND POWER 119-39 (2000). The comfort factor usually combines prototypical
qualities of managers or leaders with certain stereotypically gendered qualities. As Estrich
explains,
'The ideal woman,' one senior man tells me, 'is married, but has no children; attractive, without being too sexy; strong, but not too tough; ambitious, but not too aggressive. More buttoned up than Ally McBeal, less
sweet than Mary Richards, fewer edges than Murphy Brown; a good athlete,
and a good sport; active in professional groups, not women's groups; not a
feminist,['] .. . The comfort factor also excludes men who are not macho
enough, or too religious, to her children is a man who wants paternity leave
and doesn't like sports.
Id. at 123. A difficult issue arises when an employee who scores low on the comfort factor
brings a Title VII suit following an adverse employment decision, leaving courts to sift
whether the qualities that influenced the decision were related to gender stereotypes or
254
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masculine stereotype, and therefore important in the workplace, to
love sports, or to be aggressive and muscular? Assuming gender discrimination for men and women is actionable under Title VII, should
men be able to sue for teasing or adverse employment decisions based
on such qualities as disinterest in sports or action movies, being too
family oriented, too skinny, or too fat? If these men should not, but
effeminate men should, does this make any sense? What about the
noneffeminate, but short and overweight family man who hates sports
and loves cooking?
The point is simply that gender stereotypes are many and varied,
and one might argue that opening the door to all Title VII gender
discrimination claims invites an inquiry into the reasons why someone
is teased or denied promotion, followed by classification of qualities as
gender based or gender neutral. Therefore, one might argue that
such a classification is a substantive sociological inquiry for which the
courts are ill suited. 257
However, much can be said in favor of allowing men to bring
gender stereotyping claims. The harassment of men for being gay or
effeminate can be a brutal and humiliating form of workplace
abuse. 25 81 Title VII should protect against this abuse, assuming ade-

quate justification for such protection exists. As the Ninth Circuit has
urged, the combined precedent of Price Waterhouse and Oncale provides ajustification for allowing a variety of gender harassment claims.
Although Oncale itself did not address gender stereotyping claims
brought by males, support for their actionability can be surmised from
merely to general "likeability." Id. (quoting Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U.S. 680, 689 (1895)).
In short, it is necessary to devise a system which protects against discrimination based on
gender stereotyping without forcing courts to police likeability.
257
Of course, those making these arguments must distinguish the result in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), superseded by statute as stated in Stender v.
Lucky Stores, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1302, 1305 (N.D. Cal. 1992), where the Court found for
the plaintiff on her claim of discrimination based on sex stereotyping. However, this
would not be particularly difficult. One might simply say that Ann Hopkins had a plausible
claim for "ordinary" sex discrimination because her dress and behavior was subjected to a
level of scrutiny that a man would not face. Hopkins could have argued that men rarely
face adverse employment decisions for being too masculine, while she faced an adverse
decision for that very reason. Therefore, as a woman, she was subjected to a different
standard.
258 See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 118-19 (5th Cir.
1996) (involving a male plaintiff who endured a bar of soap being shoved in his anus and
threatened with rape), rev'd, 523 U.S. 75 (1998); McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1194 (4th Cir. 1996), abrogated &yOncale,523 U.S. at 79 (involving a
plaintiff who took medical leave following emotional trauma from sexual assault); Doe ex
rel. Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 567 (7th Cir. 1997) (involving plaintiffs who
endured testicle grabbing and other assault, taunting, and threats of rape), vacated by 523
U.S. 1001 (1998); Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1375 (8th Cir. 1996) (involving a
plaintiff who was restrained and had his testicles grabbed, producing swelling and bruising); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 34 (2d Cir. 2000) (involving a male plaintiff who
"endured [abuse] so severe that he ultimately suffered a heart attack.").
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the opinion: "[SItatutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal
evil to cover reasonably comparable evils ....,259 Men who are subjected to harassment for failing to conform to a gender stereotype are
foreseeably harmed as men in the same way that Ann Hopkins was
harmed as a woman in Price Waterhouse. Further, although there is ad-

mitted cloudiness about which characteristics are stereotypically male,
heterosexuality should be recognized as part of that stereotype.
Therefore, the precedents of Price Waterhouse and Oncale may support
a cause of action for all men discriminated against for being effeminate or gay.
As an example, imagine a male employee in an accounting firm
who was denied partnership in the course of being told to "act more
masculine, dress and walk in a more masculine manner, and stop acting 'gay."' Clearly, post-Oncale, this employee should have a cause of
action as meritorious as that of Ann Hopkins, and fortunately, he can
satisfy the MFF test. His sex was a motivating factor in the conduct and
as a result, he was foreseeably harmed. Further, one can reasonably
view the conduct as conveying a discriminatory message: namely, that
effeminate or gay men are not "real" men. Therefore, the same sex
harassment of men for not adequately conforming to their stereotypical gender roles is indeed a "comparable evil" that should be covered
by the post-Oncalereading of Title VII. Arguably, this is the preferable
approach to gender harassment. If we prohibit male claims based on
gender stereotyping, we are left with the inconsistent result that nearly
everyone is protected from harassment by homosexuals, but homosexuals and effeminate men are left unprotected as victims (that is, unless
harassed by other homosexuals). This is an unfortunate and discriminatory result for an antidiscrimination statute.
Notwithstanding the arguments presented above, there are additional objections that could be made to this Note's proposed extension of Title VII to include harassment of men based on gender or
sexual orientation. One potential issue is that, as mentioned above,
"sexual orientation" is not listed as a protected category in Title VII.
Would this test require a revision of the statute that would result in
judicial legislating? Not necessarily. What this test advocates is a correction of the judicially created inconsistency of protection.
Given that the Supreme Court has already extended the statute
both to include men and to protect against gender stereotyping of
women, we risk two absurdities by failing to include sexual orientation
as part of a gender stereotyping. First, as just noted, the case law gives
all employees protection from homosexuals (who, so the argument
goes, can harass women based on hostility to their sex and can harass
259

Oncale, 523 U.S. at 78.
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men based on desire for their sex). At the same time, the case law
does not protect homosexuals from the hostility based harassment
they are most likely to face-that from other men in the workplace.
Second, if we allow that men can sue when harassed for being effeminate but not for being gay, we encourage a bizarre form at pleading.
Plaintiffs claim they were hated and harassed for being effeminate,
and defendants escape liability by claiming the plaintiffs were actually
hated and harassed for being gay.
The second possible objection to including claims of gender stereotyping is that, properly speaking, sex may not be the motivating factor in these cases. Rather, the motivating factor is arguably sex plus
some additional property. The victim is harassed not for being male,
but for being male and effeminate or for being male and gay. It is
thus the combination of properties that motivates the harassment.
This objection misses the mark. The MFF test does not require
that sex be the only motivating factor in the harassment; it need only
be a motivating factor. Indeed, the Supreme Court has said that "because of" sex does not mean "solely" because of sex. 2 6 0 Further, the

"sex[ ]plus" objection sweeps too broadly, as it applies to most sexual
harassment cases, not just to gender stereotyping cases. In a quid pro
quo case, a woman might be harassed because she is both female and
sexually attractive. In a hostile environment case, a woman might be
harassed because she is both female and prudish. In Harbert-Yeargin,
Inc., the supervisor testified that he targeted victims for "goosing" and
"bagging" based on whether "they were 'goosey,"' that is, prone to a
startled reaction. 26' In short, victims were targeted for being male and
goosey. Given the likelihood that victims are often chosen both for
being of a particular sex and for displaying some additional quality
that makes them fun to harass, the sex plus objection does not cut
exclusively against the inclusion of gender stereotyping cases.
In short, several circuits have already recognized the actionability
of gender stereotyping claims brought by men.2 6

2

The MFF test allows

for the inclusion of these claims, including those based on sexual orientation, and should be read to do so. This modest extension follows
naturally from the Supreme Court opinions in both Oncale and Price
Waterhouse and corrects the current inconsistency of protection that
thwarts the antidiscrimination purpose of Title VII.
260
261
262
26-3

See
See
See
To

2 1

Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241 (plurality opinion).
Talbot, supra note 5, at 52, 54.
supra notes 87-100 and accompanying text.
reiterate, the circuits are currently divided on this issue. In at least the First,

Second, and Third Circuits, homosexuals can seek remedial action under Title VII if they
plead discrimination based on gender stereotyping, though not if they plead discrimination based on sexual orientation. See Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257,
261, 263 (3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1155 (2002); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d
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The MFF test should thus be adopted in place of the but-for test
for several reasons. It does not suffer from being simultaneously too
strong and too weak, as does the but-for test. Nor does it suffer from
ambiguity as to whether it tests the intent or the effect of the harassing
conduct. On the contrary, the MFF test explicitly separates the intent
from the foreseeable effect of harassment into two distinct prongs.
While being plaintiff friendly, the MFF test, as a conjunctive test, will
not turn Title VII into a civility code for the workplace. It simply
holds accountable those harassers who are motivated to harass and
can foresee harm to victims based on their sex.
CONCLUSION

This Note began with an array of sexual harassment cases, some
with bizarre and unpredictable results. The locus of unpredictability
was the but-for interpretation of Title VII's "because of" sex requirement, especially after the Supreme Court's decision in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.26 4 Circuit courts as well as academics have

struggled to classify an ever increasing variety of sexual harassment
cases as sex discrimination under Title VII, achieving only limited success. This Note therefore proposes that, in deciding whether conduct
occurred "because of" sex, courts should look to whether the victim's
sex was a motivating factor and created a foreseeable harm in the harassment. The proposed test avoids the intuitive absurdities produced
by the but-for test, accords with classic tort law notions of causation,
and resolves the inconsistencies in same sex harassment cases that
have plagued the circuits since Oncale.

33, 35-36 (2d Cir. 2000); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 258-59
(1st Cir. 1999). The Ninth Circuit extends protection to plaintiffs pleading either type of
discrimination. See Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1063-64 (9th Cir.
2002), cert. denied, 2003 WL 1446593; Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 874-75
(9th Cir. 2001). The Fourth Circuit appears to extend protection only to those harassed by
homosexuals. See Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of An. Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 143-44 (4th Cir. 1996).
264 523 U.S. 75 (1998).

